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This particularistic and exclusionary form of identity 
politics has intensified in recent years within and 
among nations. ____ !t is responsible for some of the most 
egregious violations of international humanitarian 
law and, in several instances, of elementary 
standards of humanity .. __ Negative forms of identity 
politics are a potent and potentially explosive force. 
Great care must be taken to recognise, confront 
and restrain them lest they destroy the potential for 
peace and progress that the new era holds in store 
(Kofi Annan, The Guardian, (Nigeria) 1997:8). 
Single or multiple identities underlying fears of losing 
national culture is an implicit belief that identities 
are singular. But people do not have single fixed 
identities. They have multiple and often changing 
identities and loyalties. Accepting Multiple Identities 
is a major social transformation. But history shows 
that it does happen. Almost all European countries 
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have undergone such a transformation. (pp.101-102 
Human Development Report 2004). 
INTRODUCTION 
The colonial project which was foisted on Africa largely by 
Britain and France left the continent more dis-united and generated 
more consciousness among groups about their distinctiveness and 
those factors that separated them ("we") from others ("they"). 
One of the most enduring outcomes of the colonial contact was 
the creation of self-doubt and the negation of identity formation 
among the dominated population. Frantz Fanon (1969:200) gave 
an eloquent account of this development when he said inter alia 
that 
Because it is a systematic negation of the other 
person and a furious determination to deny the 
other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism 
forces the people it dominates to ask themselves 
the question constantly: In reality, who am I? 
Under the guise of anthropology as a scientific enterprise, 
scholars made fortunes out of highlighting the features of warrior 
tribes or what were referred to as the martial races, and their 
kingdoms, state and acephalous societies. The presence of large 
ethnic groups, some of them far larger than those in Europe, was 
conveniently ignored so that the label and stigma of tribe would 
stick. In the main, some of Africa's complex socio-economic and 
political organizations were ignored by European authors. 
In the struggle that culminated in Africa's independence, the 
different groups were, in most cases, forced to coordinate their 
struggle in order to be free of colonial domination. It must be 
remembered that the road to independence was bloody in most 
cases, though in some, it was granted on a platter of gold. The 
Maumau uprising in Kenya and the coal-miners strike as well as 
the Aba Women's riots in Nigeria symbolized bloody resistance 
to colonialism and its methods. Kenya's rural producers objected 
to land redistribution away from peasant farmers. The Maumau 
resistance was severest in settler regions where there were 
plantations. It was in essence, Kenya's peasants resistance to 
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the colonial occupation of their land. Really, there were many 
features of the colonial society that were provocative: segregation 
in housing, employment and schooling, and the killing of natives 
for pleasure. 
The colonial setting thus produced a culture of violence and 
brutality directed at the natives. The claim of a civilizing mission 
in Africa by the colonial powers was indeed absurd. Africa later 
realised its naivety in endorsing, generally without much resistance, 
the European incursion into its territory, the enslavement of its 
people and the exploitation of its resources. This awareness, 
however, came rather too late. The damage had been done. 
Communities had been decimated, resources looted and ways 
of life had been adulterated. The trust basis of society and the 
perception of others as the extension of the self almost became 
extinct. A world-renowned novelist, Chinua Achebe, had provided 
an excellent summary of this development in Things Fall Apart, and 
for Africa the centre indeed no longer holds. In the definition of 
the colonisers, to be accepted as modern, Africans must evidently 
demonstrate a measure of distance from their culture and thus 
from their roots. Africans were and still are expected to exhibit 
a hatred for themselves if they are to be described as modern 
thus, part of globalisation - a new euphemism for slavery and 
dependency. Really, how can one hate the self which is what 
an individual's denial of his culture comes to? Unfortunately, in 
several facets of life in Africa, self-denial of our essence lingers. 
The colonial constitutional development created a new 
consciousness by making ethnic affiliation a major element 
in political socialization and leadership recruitment, but at 
independence, the goals that were set included national integration 
rather than regional or ethnic solidarity. What a paradox? These 
goals were incompatible as loyalty to the ethnic or regional groups 
was difficult to transfer to the nascent state. In fact, as for the 
majority, the notion or the existence of the state was only on paper 
or an idea of the empire builders, itself an afterthought as it was 
after World War II that preparations were commenced, shoddy 
ones at that, for the transfer of power to the colonial subjects. 
The colonial order was strident in its opposition to collaborative 
activities between ethnic groups. Colonialism triumphed mostly 
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on the divide and rule tactics. 
Thus individuals in the post-colonial African society display 
multiple identities. These identities are variously expressed. An 
individual's membership of the new nation-state is a nascent 
form of identity expression. The individual's membership of his 
ethno-religious group is much older and more enduring than his 
membership of the new nation-state. The individual may also 
be a member of the recently-formed employee's association 
- the Trade Union Congress. The identities that can be paraded 
are indeed numerous. These multiple identities come to play in 
moments of critical decision-making and these identities do affect 
an individual's life chances, the socio-economic and political 
opportunities that are manipulable by him. These loyalties, rather 
than waning, have waxed over the years and they do have 
implications for the enjoyment of citizenship rights and Africa's 
democratization processes. 
These identities are often conflicting in the interests that 
they seek to project and protect. They may, in fact, obstruct the 
universalistic and libertarian principles on which democracy is 
premised. They are, however, not fixed as they are open to activation 
or suppression or even transformation depending on the events in 
the social environment (see the opening sentences by Kofi Annan). 
There are certain objective realities that dictate which of the several 
identities comes to the fore. State actors in Africa seems to prefer 
the fragmentation of identities as these make the formation of a 
formidable opposition that could challenge the state's hegemonic 
rule a remote possibility. The state could thus act surreptitiously 
to encourage the factionalisation and disintegration of strong civil 
societies in order to ward off strong counter-hegemonic forces and 
thus weaken those identities that are considered as undesirable. A 
faction of the state, armed with strong identity credentials, could 
also seek to pull down the state. The foregoing issues are made 
more explicit in the following discussion. 
Some definitions of the key words in this paper are appropriate. 
The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology refers to identity as the 
sense of the self that develops as the child differentiates from parents 
and family and takes a place in society. The sense of identity could 
be based on ethno-religious and temporal factors or geography. 
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It is often the basis of social action and political behaviour. The 
sense of identity deepens in a plural society where a group, just for 
reasons of its being different, suffers discrimination. Identity could 
also be based on some physical characteristics. Citizen's rights 
refer to those rights that one enjoys by virtue of one's membership 
in a country. The scope of these rights owes a lot to the profile of 
the state and political struggle. By democratization, it has meant 
the opening up of the political space, the demise of military rule 
and the introduction of multi-party democracy in place of the one­
party state. However, we could have multi-partism with individuals 
not really having alternatives to choose from. 
This paper's objective is to highlight how multiple identities may 
facilitate or hinder access to citizenship rights. Multiple identities are 
paraded for a variety of reasons. They may have their own relative 
autonomy but somehow they connect individuals to specific rights 
and privileges from which others may be excluded. Democracy, on 
the other hand, claims universalistic ethos. Theoretically, therefore, 
democracy and the disclosure of multiple identities cannot co-exist 
as they have potentially conflicting appeals. 
In the second section, the paper raises some theoretical issues 
while in the third section, the paper focuses on identity politics 
and democratization in Africa and highlights how the outcome 
has impacted on citizenship rights. The conclusions are contained 
in section four where I issue a caution on the problem of politics 
of social exclusion as I attempt to plot the path to a sustainable 
democratic future for Africa in the midst of multiple identities. 
By its very nature, democracy does not admit nor approve of 
group rights yet in Africa, groups claim to property (until recently) 
eminently override the claims of individuals. The challenge, 
therefore, for scholars in and about Africa, is how to make the 
practice of democracy in Africa become more accommodative and 
tolerant of plurality of identities and thoughts while simultaneously 
advancing citizenship rights and thus democratic consolidation. 
SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES 
To those who believe that globalization is a most desirable and 
beneficial phenomenon, the resistance to it remains a major puzzle. 
In many parts of Africa, Asia, the middle East and Latin America, 
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what globalization holds out are believed by many to be false. The 
more the intensity and profundity of the change process, the more 
enduring seems the value system that contradict the move toward a 
uni-polar global hegemony. This resistance has several dimensions. 
The most worrying is that which seeks to emphasize and even 
adore the distinctiveness of a group, its homogeneity and those 
characteristics which separate it from those of the others. In the 
extreme, this position does not admit of ethno-religious and political 
pluralism. This world view was similar to the position of those 
who regard the triumph of western civilization as incontrovertible 
and inexorable. An average African, perhaps an Asian too, 
simultaneously discloses multiple identities - a village person, a 
town's man or woman, a Muslim or Christian, an active member 
of an ethnic association, an employee and employer, a politician, 
member of an old school association, an age grade member, a 
unionist, an active member of a neigbourhood association and 
perhaps a lineage head. The demand of these diverse associations 
on an individual may conflict and if simultaneous, is capable of 
creating a dilemma for the individual actor. 
Social formation in Africa is complex, and identities may appear 
to be ambiguous and conflictive as individuals simultaneously 
occupy many roles. In my field work experiences, I have come 
across individuals who are labourers, farmers, employers and shop 
owners at the same time. Most Africans actively participate in the 
formal and the informal spheres simultaneously. The playing out 
of many roles sequentially or simultaneously is seen as normal 
by many. A Nigerian politician describes himself in the following 
terms is indeed typical of others: 
I am a living laboratory of my age .... I am at once the 
cocoa farmer, mercantile clerk, the civil servant, the 
petty trader, the transporter, the capitalist and the 
intellectual (and now the politician) all materials for 
the study of the social scientist (Adegoke Adelabu 
quoted in Post and Jenkins, 1973:33). 
Where individuals parade multiple identities, role multiplicity sets 
in which in turn complicate social class formation and political 
action as well. Thus an 
analysis of politics, religion, kinship were ....... a 
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part of any adequate account of social change as 
economics and that the manner of their interaction, 
in any particular society, must be a matter for open 
enquiry, rather than the known consequences of a 
universal model of society (Peel, 1983 :6 ). 
How to account for the re-surgence of identity based politics 
and its enduring nature in the midst of globalization remains a 
major challenge for academic and state actors especially those 
who believe in a unipolar world and read too far into the end 
of the cold war as signifying 'The End of History' (Fukayama, 
2001 ). Some authors indeed had predicted the ultimate triumph 
of western civilization and its values in its competition with other 
civilizations (Hunttington, 2001 ). The event of 9/11 was however a 
sad reminder that there are people in the world that do not see the 
reality that others cherish, who reject the consumption-oriented 
society and who do not subscribe to the values which others hold 
dear. The end of history is thus further away. The demise of bi­
polarism and of the Russian empire may not really signal the end 
of history nor the ultimate triumph of western values. The future is 
really pregnant with a lot of meanings. It is worthwhile to recognize 
that identities are not static, they get transformed and are open to 
manipulation. In their transformation, groups that were otherwise 
once antagonistic may be forced to pool resources and sink their 
differences in order to confront what is perceived as a common 
monster. The forging of political alliances are often dictated by 
vested interests and these are often open-ended, and practical 
realities would dictate which alliances are most feasible and which 
of the identities should be on the front burner. 
In both the developing and even developed countries, groups 
within states whether these groups are religious or ethnic groups, 
are claiming rights that are exclusive to them and from which 
others are to be excluded. Indeed, identity-based politics has not 
abated whether in Spain between the Basques and the Spaniards; 
or in Belgium between the Fleming and the Walloon; or in the 
Irish Republic between the Catholic and the Protestants; or in 
America between the American-whites and the other hyphenated­
Americans; or in Nigeria between the different ethnic groups; or 
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in Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi. In its early history, the 
American-whites did not all have the same rights - the timing of 
migration to America was initially important in the determination 
of political rights (see Archdeacon, 1984). 
There has emerged a serious contestation between the rights 
being claimed by those who consider themselves and their 
groups as indigenes and those who are considered by them as 
"strangers" and who may also see themselves as such. Behaviour 
and attitudes that have practical outcome for social exclusion 
are often premised on these distinctions between the notions 
of "citizens" (indigenes) and "strangers." Mamdani (1996) had 
referred to this dichotomy between citizens and strangers in terms 
of citizens and subjects, whereby the colonial regime administered 
the people of the colonies under two laws - one for the citizens 
and the other for the subjects. The exclusionary practices that flow 
from this dichotomy do occasionally produce overt behaviour that 
could burst out. The social fabric of society could be eroded thus 
endangering political stability and peaceful co-existence of groups. 
The modern state is thus under pervasive pressure from groups that 
make competing claims over the state's scarce values. The state is 
hardly in a position to meet the claims of competing groups over 
state resources. Whatever our conception of the modern state, in 
spite of all its paraphernalia and sophisticated architecture, is after 
all, preoccupied with the regulation of the relationship between 
diverse groups and interests in society. 
In the relationship in which individuals and groups become 
entangled, they are often not equally treated. The denial of access 
to significant resources may endanger political stability and the 
enjoyment of citizenship rights by identifiable groups in society. 
Social and political inequality promote feelings of alienation and 
frustration. Political participation becomes encumbered. The 
connotation of citizenship as 'full members of the community' 
(Marshall and Bottomore 1992: 18) is denied to those who are 
perceived as being different from others. There are three kinds of 
rights that have become popular - civil (rights of free speech, right 
to worship etc); political (right to vote and be voted for); and social 
(right to housing, health, etc). These rights, even under advanced 
capitalism can readily be abridged or compromised. 
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The concepts of social prejudice and stereotype are important 
in understanding the ways in which people judge and treat others 
(the out-group) who are different from them (the in-group). 
Somehow, through the process of socialization, individuals begin 
to construct their identities. As individuals become full-fledged 
members of their society, they unconsciously acquire its cognitive 
map of 'we' and 'they' and they thus inevitably inherit a world that 
had been perfected by others. Individuals' view of reality become 
tainted from birth. This view often fails to recognise other systems 
of seeing and being. The end-product of this process could be 
hatred or love for others that are adjudged as being different. This 
point raises some methodological issues which are outside the 
scope of this discussion. 
Bibby's (1959) work dealt extensively with how prejudice 
impact on our behaviour toward others. Prejudice forces people 
to draw conclusions before having the opportunity to interact with 
others. Though prejudice is learned, it is difficult to unlearn even 
when compelling information to the contrary is presented. Hatred 
is an extreme manifestation of social prejudice. In this connection, 
I can mention the massacre of the Jews during the second world 
war. There was also the hatred of the Arabs and Islam in America 
and Europe after the event of September 11 (see Mamdani, 2004). 
In France, the ban on head ties was believed to be directed at Arab 
women. In Rwanda, the mutual distrust and hatred between the 
Tutsi and Hutu, and between the Croatia and Serbs in Yugoslavia 
are examples of this point. The human tragedy in the Darfur region 
in Sudan is the outcome of social prejudice, social exclusion and 
intolerance. The Darfur region in southern Sudan had been the 
cynosure of world attention because of the Sudanese genocidal 
attacks on the non-Arabs. This tragedy is a direct result of the 
Sudanese government's failure to manage multiple-identities and 
pluralism. 
As a response to the centrifugal tendency and the exclusionary 
politics that social prejudice and stereotype may generate, states 
have often designed different political contraptions to contain the 
divisive implications. It would be recalled however, that colonial 
rule had previously amplified the wedge that might have existed 
previously between groups. Thus, as a prelude to its politics of 
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divide and rule through the indirect rule system, the ethnographers 
and anthropologists of Africa had altered the Africans' mode of 
thought. This was accomplished through the categorization of 
Africa into different ethnic and linguistic groups with little regard 
to common identities. Yes, differences existed, but these are often 
exaggerated to make nonsense of any possibility of reconciliation 
or coordinated action against colonial domination. The concept 
of tribe was used to refer to the people of Africa irrespective of 
the level of social and population development. But European 
groups with even lower population and less sophisticated political 
architecture were described as nations. That the anthropologists 
and the missionaries were the handmaidens of colonialism could 
not be disputed and in many instances they collaborated and their 
activities reinforced each other. It did not, therefore, take much 
time before Africans began to think of themselves in terms not of 
their own making (Grinker and Steiner, (1997:47). 
The intellectual support which was provided for colonialism, 
the self-doubt, and social prejudice that thereby became fostered 
cannot be regarded as insignificant. Among Europeans and 
Africans alike, the thinking that some people were unprogressive 
and unintelligent whereas other groups were portrayed as the 
opposites became widespread. The work of Levine (1966) on 
Dreams and Deeds was one of such classic works in the fostering 
of social prejudice. Levine's work identified the lbos as more 
mobile on the indices of modernization and were followed 
closely by the Yoruba with the Hausa-Fulani trailing far behind the 
two major groups. The practical consequence of this 'scientific' 
endeavour and similar other works was a portrayal of the different 
African groups as not only incompatible but with antagonistic and 
irreconcilable aspirations. A year after this publication, the civil 
war broke out in Nigeria. It is not being suggested that the book 
was the cause of the Nigerian civil war but such anthropological 
works fueled feelings of group hostilities. Such writings had offered 
enough justifications for the exclusion of certain groups from socio­
economic opportunities. 
However, the fallacy of this social science thought was evident 
in Nigeria where the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group was thought of by 
Europeans as unprogressive, unintelligent and backward. These 
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wntrngs were in the main ideological and teleological hence 
Claude Ake's reference to social science in Africa as imperialism 
(Ake, 1979). African leaders, however, continue to fan the embers 
of hatred and parochialism as these suit them. In Nigeria for 
example, the Hausa-Fulani, mainly because the British handed 
over power to the group believing that they were more pliable and 
conservative have come to see themselves as destined to rule. This 
remains strong and the northern governors once said' ... whatever 
anyone may say, the incontestable fact remains that in the political 
equation of this country, the North holds the ace. In fact, if there is 
no North, there will be no Nigeria' (Sunday Punch, November 19, 
2000). This hardened prejudice makes nonsense of the dialogue 
under the auspices of the National Political Reform Committee 
which was inaugurated on February 21, 2005. Not surprisingly, the 
issues of resource control, resource sharing and of which ethnic 
group should rule dominated discussions at the meetings of the 
Political Reform Committee. The participants did not demonstrate 
equal concern to wealth creation, good governance, social justice 
and how to overcome mutual suspicion between groups. 
Unless social prejudice is moderated, the practical outcome 
would be that some individuals would come to be defined as 
strangers (or settlers) and would be regarded as having no full 
citizenship rights which are available to the indigenes. The 
citizenship claims which are open to the non-indigenes became 
qualified and the foundation for treating them unequally and with 
disdain had become established though sometimes contestable. 
In these ways, identity politics become antithetical to the notion 
of democracy and the rule of law as outlined by Montesque and 
John Locke. What really is left of citizenship rights in the absence 
of equality before the law and equality of access to the market, 
education, healthcare and housing among others? Without the 
right to vote and the right to property, citizenship rights are 
deprived of all their vitality and spirit. Some of the ways in which 
identity politics constitute a direct challenge to the nuances of 
democracy and the very notion of citizenship are discussed in the 
next section. 
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IDENTITY POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
Identity politics revolves around the parade of particularistic 
features as the basis for political participation and inclusion as well as 
the enjoyment of citizenship rights and privileges. This identification 
could be such parameters as gender, ethnic, language, religious 
or regional affiliation. In India for example, distinctions are made 
between the different caste groups - some are regarded as free 
born and they exercise more political, social and civil rights than 
the others. Marriage and other forms of interaction are not often 
permitted between the groups in order to avoid contamination. In 
the eastern part of Nigeria, the Osu caste is discriminated against 
in marriage, economic and political sphere. Even in the United 
Kingdom, it is difficult for someone who is not from the mainland 
to become the Prime Minister. Scotland not only has its own 
judiciary but it is also set to have its own foreign mission in such 
countries as China. The battle for self-determination by the Basque 
is believed to have reached its crescendo. The Fleming and the 
Walloon in Belgium continue to contest their ethnic autonomy. 
Also very early in its development, there were qualifications as 
to who can become senators or representatives in the American 
Congress. Foreign-born Americans were not then on the same 
footing as home-born Americans in terms of citizenship rights. 
Identity politics is not a phenomenon that is unknown to 
Western European or North American politics nor is it disappearing 
under advanced capitalism. To be a representative or a senator, 
one must have been a citizen for at least 7 or 9 years, respectively, 
prior to assuming office. This provision was contained in Article I. In 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution, it was decreed that no immigrant 
naturalized after the adoption of the Constitution could become 
President or Vice-President (see Archdeacon, 1984:54). 
Because it emphasizes political participation and the exercise 
of rights that draw from particularistic principles, the universalistic 
and libertarian notion of democracy become easily compromised. 
Even where the codes of entitlements to participation are written 
down, there are norms and practices which define those that 
are to be included. Under such a system, competitive politics is 
handicapped. Political roles become rigidly defined and those who 
capture political power see it as divinely ordained. In a multi-ethnic 
society, however, individuals who transcend identity politics may 
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have an upper hand and wider base to recruit supporters from. 
There are individuals whose identities are not straightforward 
either for reasons of marriage or birth. Though Soni Ghandi led the 
Congress Party to victory, she could not become the Indian Prime 
Minister because she was regarded as a foreigner - an Italian by 
birth but an Indian by marriage. During her campaign, she herself 
had made use of the Ghandi's family respected identity. 
This particularistic notion of politics is more common in 
Africa and in spite of Africa's claim to be experimenting with 
democratization, instances of erosion of democratic and citizenship 
rights are on the ascendancy. I shall refer to four case studies to 
illustrate the vibrancy and not the demise of identity politics in 
Africa as has been theoretically and enthusiastically announced 
by some authors. I relied on the internet and newspapers for most 
of this section. Sometime in 1996, the then President of Zambia, 
Frederick Chiluba, (using the machinery of his Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy), altered the constitution of the country 
to prevent Kenneth Kaunda from standing for elections. When 
Kaunda challenged the constitutional provision which sought to 
strip him of his Zambian citizenship, the court ruled that Kaunda, 
being born of Malawian parents and having not renounced his 
Malawian nationality, had thus governed Zambia illegally from 
1964-1991. Of course, it was clear that the intent was to prevent 
Kaunda from exercising his political rights in the 1996 election. 
In Cote d'Ivoire, identity politics came to the fore after the 
death of its former dictator - Felix Houphount-Boigny-in 1993. 
Henry Konan Bedie had assumed the presidency of the once 
buoyant West African cocoa-producing economy. Bedie sooner 
than later introduced a new concept of 'lvorite' - real lvorians as 
different from foreigners. The hidden agenda being to regulate 
political competition. Alassane Quattara was the first casualty and 
the only target. Though many became victims of this obnoxious 
policy as they were disenfranchised (because of their new identity 
as foreigners), Quattara who was the main target was prevented 
from contesting the presidential election. This politics of exclusion 
remains at the centre of the crisis in the once peaceful and buoyant 
Cote d'Ivoire that had previously been paraded by France as a 
model of a progressive economy and stable country. The groups 
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at war in Cote d'Ivoire are yet to lay down their arms. 
Sometime in 1982, Nigerians woke up to learn of the 
deportation of Abdul Rahman Shugaba, the then majority leader 
of the House of Assembly in Borno State, Nigeria. The allegation 
against him by the then civilian administration was that he was not a 
Nigerian but from a neighbouring republic. Shugabi's real offence, 
however, was that he was being too critical of the then federal 
government. The federal government was also uncomfortable 
with Shugaba's association with the then progressive politicians in 
southern Nigeria. The ruling northern political party (the National 
Party of Nigeria) thought that Shugaba, being a northerner, should 
identify with his fellow northerners and their dominant political 
party. Though the court ruled that his deportation was illegal, he 
suffered serious infraction of his fundamental rights as a citizen. 
The events in Togo, West Africa brought to the surface the 
resilience of identity politics. After the death in February, 2005, 
of President Eyadema, who had ruled Togo since 1967, his son, 
Faure, was hurriedly sworn in after the constitution had been 
amended to prevent the Speaker from ascending to power. The 
only qualification of Faure was his being the son of Eyadema. Of 
course, this provoked a series of demonstrations and it attracted 
sanctions from ECOWAS and the African Union. Elections were 
later held and Faure was elected. 
The above illustrations have shown how identity politics can 
obstruct the wheel of democratization as it erodes the political 
rights of citizens. It could sometimes degenerate into forced 
migration and mass displacement of people who are routinely 
turned into refugees as the struggle for citizenship rights assume 
fratricidal dimension. There are ample instances of this in Africa. 
Once the political rights of citizens are violated, the assault on 
other rights become common. Identity politics can, in this way, 
constitute impediments to development. In Nigeria for example, 
there are parts of the country where land rights may not be 
granted to non-indigenes and where those who regarded as such 
are confined to specific areas meant for strangers. So frustrating 
to Nigeria's President was this phenomenon of "strangers" and 
"settlers" that he declared in 2004 that 'All Nigerians are settlers" 
(The Punch/ July 3, 2004). The manipulation of multiple identities 
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endangers the very tenet of liberal democracy. In Nigeria, it poses 
a direct challenge to property rights (see Nnoli, 1978:115-116). 
In the conclusions which now follow, I outline the ways in which 
multiple identities may obstruct citizenship rights and thus the 
consolidation of effective democratization in Africa. 
CONCLUSIONS: MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AND EFFECTIVE 
DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA 
Africa has certain features which may not predispose it to 
effective democratization. Unlike the countries of Western Europe 
where most people live in an urban environment, most of Africa's 
population reside in the rural areas. Though the annual rate of 
urban population growth outstrips that of the rural area, yet over 
60% of Africa's population of about 500 million are rural dwellers. 
Rural poverty is also more severe than that of the urban area. 
Whereas urban dwellers may employ or adopt strategies to escape 
some imperatives of the consequences of multiple identities, their 
rural counterparts have little room to maneuver themselves out of 
the crisis. Though research reports have often indicated the desire 
of the urban African middle class to be involved in hometown 
activities, in reality, they desperately look for an escape route from 
simultaneous rural-urban involvement. This is not surprising as deep 
involvement in the affairs of the community costs money. On each 
visit, rural folks expect gifts in cash and in kind. The simultaneous 
involvement of elites in the rural and urban sphere, apart from 
straining them financially, exposes them to embezzlement which 
may have deleterious effects on social services provision. The 
problem of poverty is thereby compounded. It also has the potential 
of undermining tradition and political rights at the grassroots. Those 
who exert tremendous power in the urban space also desperately 
seek to line up the rural poor as clients. 
Individuals may have different identities which can be 
simultaneously disclosed, but acting out the roles which flow 
from these identities may provoke a dilemma or even role 
nonperformance. Role nonperformance creates room for 
ineffective discharge of functions which may, in combination with 
other factors, promote poverty. Poverty remains severe in Africa 
as over half of the population live on less than one dollar a day. 
111 
Ethnic Studies Review Volume 28: 2 
The corruption of Africa's political elites has prevented the majority 
of its toiling masses from taking advantage of its rich resource 
endowment. This corruption arises in the context of conflicting 
pressure for resources from kinsmen and women. During research 
interviews, poor people have often openly argued that for them 
the democratization project is disconnected from their lived 
experiences what with dilapidated school buildings, unpaid salaries, 
pension and gratuities in the midst of acute sense of insecurity 
of lives and property as well as the epileptic infrastructural base. 
African leaders display open disdain for the ballot box and thus 
the wishes of the people. The elites simply assume that their 
money should deliver the votes. It is difficult to appreciate how 
democracy can work under conditions of widespread poverty and 
corruption, which in turn often precipitate intra-ethnic and inter­
ethnic conflict by forcing multiple identities to the front burner of 
political competition. 
Through whatever lens this is viewed, the simultaneous 
participation in the rural and the urban sphere takes time and 
money, it takes more of the time resources of the poor and the 
physical resources of the middle class. So is the simultaneous 
or sequential disclosure of identity. This may send contradictory 
signals. For effective democratization to take root, the people's 
elected representatives must be monitored but the individuals 
who are to monitor are also deeply involved in cult-related and 
intense religious activities which may entail night vigil, clapping, 
dancing and other forms of rituals and celebrations. 
In the midst of the above, is it not surprising that there is any 
symbol of procedural if not substantive democracy in Africa? The 
absence of an overwhelming political apathy in Africa in the midst 
of multiple identities and their all encompassing expression really 
raises a major theoretical puzzle. There are some other relevant 
and pertinent issues about the future of democracy in Africa. In 
Africa, group ownership of land as the main economic resource 
is common. In fact, several years of capitalism had only begun to 
marginally erode groups' claim to land ownership and other viable 
resources. Theoretically, where a lineage or clan owns land, the 
exercise of individuals rights over such resources is constrained. 
In Africa, individuals may exercise the usufruct rights in 
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property but not the right of alienation, and law courts have 
often affirmed the superiority of group rights in property over 
individual rights. This, no doubt is a fetter in the advancement 
of capitalism. Yet, liberal democracy can triumph better under 
conditions of advanced capitalism. The problems of insecurity of 
life and property, coupled with poor infrastructure have meant 
that people have to organize themselves in groups to agitate 
for and create access to better services. Many have learned to 
take their exit from the state (Osaghae, 1999). Group solidarity 
thereby gets strengthened. Individuals who enter into politics are 
expected to exploit their offices to project group rights by placing 
kith and kins in employment positions even over those with 
better qualifications. Successful politicians are expected to attract 
government patronage to the community. The success or failure 
of politicians is measured in these terms. How is this expectation 
compatible with the universal competitive claim of democracy on 
individual basis? The presence of rich mineral resources in fact 
offers a veritable platform for identity politics as communities 
are forced to form groups in order to be able to exert sufficient 
political leverage to obtain a desirable outcome. It is envisaged 
that had Nigeria's agricultural capitalism progressed, it might 
have recorded a more impressive outlook in its democratic path 
than it had been possible under oil rents which more than cocoa 
are more supportive of group claims and group pressure. Under 
commercial agriculture, land alienation and sales of labour power 
had commenced and these were becoming a common place. 
Really, labour-capital relations had then made some progress. 
Thus fractured citizenship rather than common citizenship has 
become elevated. Nigeria's Constitutions in 1979 and 1999 had 
given the prime of place to what is referred to as the federal 
character which in essence project group rights and identities over 
those of individuals. Jinadu (2004:31-34) has documented several 
instances whereby fractured citizenship triumphed over common 
citizenship. To be appointed into high political offices, individuals 
are forced to mobilize the sponsorship of their ethnic or religious 
group or other forms of identity. Thus the liberal theory of the 
state has been argued to be fundamentally flawed because of its 
parochial, unificationist and assimilationist assumptions (Jinadu, 
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2004:12). The assumption by the liberal expectancy school that 
with capitalism and globalization, the features that separate 
one group from the other would disappear remains unfulfilled. 
The radical expectancy school has also failed in that social class 
affiliation is not exhaustive of identity formation. At some levels 
in some societies, social class differences are subsumed by other 
categories. The foregoing pose a serious theoretical challenge to 
scholars on Africa. In order to advance Africa's democratization, 
we may have to concede political rights to groups while 
simultaneously admitting of individual citizenship rights. In most of 
Africa, children are simultaneously born into groups and individual 
families. The rights which groups exercise over such children as 
individuals may be waning but they exist. When individuals die, 
the groups into which they were born largely bury them. If Africa's 
practice of democracy, and citizenship claims are to be sustainable 
and enduring, they must be anchored in the people's culture. 
As much as possible, Africa must be supported to be itself in 
this age of democratization and globalization if the process of 
abridgement of rights is to be arrested. Inasmuch as the present 
practices of democracy are tantamount to dis-empowerment, 
they constitute a fetter on the exercise of citizenship rights. A 
veritable platform for political disenchantment thereby becomes 
feasible. The opening sentences of this paper by Kofi Annan and 
the 2004 Human Development Report bear testimony to the 
fluidity and elasticity of identities. The view that the end of history 
is here forecloses tolerance of individuals and groups who choose 
multiple identities. 
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